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I
n early March 2003, Carlo Urbani, a World Health
Organization (WHO) epidemiologist stationed in
Vietnam, alerted the global health community to the high
transmissibility and lethality associated with an apparently
new respiratory disease. This disease, now called severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), is believed to have
emerged in China in November 2002 and progressed to a
global health threat by the spring of 2003 (1–3). On March
15, 2003, with clusters of SARS cases being reported from
China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and Canada,
WHO issued a global travel alert. At that point, the inter-
national health community faced a potential pandemic for
which there were no identified causal agent, no diagnostic
laboratory assays, no defined properties or risk factors for
transmission, no infection-control practices of proven effi-
cacy, and no known treatment or prevention measures.
Given that setting, the declaration on July 5 that SARS had
been contained (in less than 4 months after its initial recog-
nition), represented a remarkable achievement for a truly
extraordinary international public health effort. 
However, the SARS outbreak was not contained before
it had had a substantial impact: 8,098 cases involving 774
deaths were attributed to SARS (4) (the original WHO
case definitions [5] were revised during the outbreak to
those shown in the Table); fear of contagion was rife in
many communities, especially among healthcare workers;
and billions of dollars had been lost in the airline and
tourism industries, resulting in bankruptcies of airlines and
other businesses. However, the SARS public health
response effort was equally important: the world’s scientif-
ic, clinical, and public health communities had successful-
ly instituted sensitive surveillance for the disease; isolation
and infection-control practices—with intensive contact
tracing and community containment, including quaran-
tine—were effective in limiting continued spread in most
cases; and the causative agent and diagnostic assays for
detecting the disease were identified. 
Now, nearly 1 year after the world first faced this infec-
tious disease challenge, the public health community is
equipped with a broader understanding of the agent, its
pathophysiology, clinical signs and symptoms, risk factors
for transmission, and public health measures that can suc-
cessfully contain the disease. The breadth of this under-
standing and international scope of the outbreak response
are reflected in the range of manuscript topics in this issue
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The origins of the SARS-associated coronavirus
(SARS-CoV) remain unclear; however, data suggest that
the outbreak may have been preceded by transmission of
this or a related virus from animals to humans. SARS-CoV
has now been shown to infect (although not necessarily be
transmissible through) other animals, including macaques
(7), ferrets and cats (8), and pigs and chickens (9),
although none of these animals are known to act as natural
amplifying hosts for the virus. Antibodies to SARS-CoV
have been identified in animal handlers (10), and a SARS-
like coronavirus has been identified in palm civets and
other animals indigenous to Guangdong Province, where
SARS likely originated (11). Furthermore, serologic stud-
ies in Hong Kong suggest that SARS-like viruses may
have circulated in human populations before the
2002–2003 outbreak (12). 
As the SARS outbreak unfolded in Vietnam, Singapore,
and Hong Kong, hospital workers stood out as a critical
high-risk group. We now know that in many locations the
SARS outbreak began with ill travelers coming from other
SARS-affected areas (13). For many affected areas with
low case numbers, such as the United States (where only
eight cases were laboratory-confirmed [14–16]), SARS
remained a travel-associated illness only, with no hospital
or community transmission (14,17,18). However, health-
care settings played a key role in amplifying disease out-
breaks (19). In locations such as Singapore, Canada, and
Vietnam, disease was transmitted to many hospital work-
ers by ill travelers or contacts of ill travelers, but in these
locations, disease was successfully contained within hospi-
tals. If the disease was not rapidly controlled in healthcare
settings, as occurred in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong,
spread into the community occurred, resulting in extensive
disease transmission (20,21) (Figure).
Most SARS patients had a clear history of exposure to
other SARS patients or SARS-affected areas. Even in
China, despite its extensive community transmission,
intensive investigation successfully linked many cases pre-
viously classified as “unlinked” to high-risk exposures to
SARS patients in fever clinics and other locations (20).
Older persons were at greatest risk for severe disease, with
fatality rates of nearly 50% in persons >60 years of age,
whereas, for unclear reasons, fewer children were affected;
those that were had lower morbidity and mortality (22–24).
A critical question has been whether SARS-CoV is
transmitted through large droplets or on fomites, as occurs
with respiratory syncytial virus, variola, and mycoplasma,
or through aerosols, as occurs with measles and varicella.
We now know that large droplets are likely the primary
mode of transmission; however, in some circumstances,
clusters suggestive of aerosol transmission have been
described (19,25,26). Transmission appears to be heteroge-
neous. Most probable SARS cases were associated with
little or no transmission. Although low transmission most
commonly occurs in association with appropriate infec-
tion-control practices (27), cases have also been docu-
mented with no transmission despite ample exposure
opportunities (17,18,28–30). Transmission in hospital set-
tings has been clearly documented (25,31–33). Hospital
transmission, along with infrequent “superspreading
events,” involving transmission from one case to many
secondary cases, was critical to propagating the outbreak
(19,25,26,34). Limited risk factors for superspreading
events have been identified, including more severe illness,
slightly older age, and an increased number of secondary
contacts (34); however, further epidemiologic, virologic,
and host-factor studies are needed to fully elucidate the
risk factors that underlie SARS-CoV transmission. 
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Figure. Cumulative cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome
and proportion among healthcare workers by geographic region,
November 1, 2002–July 31, 2003.
Table. World Health Organization SARS case definitions   
Suspected case-patient: a person presenting after November 1, 2002,
b 
with a history of (ALL THREE): 
1. High fever (>38°C) AND 
2. Cough or breathing difficulty, AND 
3. One or more of the following exposures during the 10 days 
before onset of symptoms:  
close contact
c with a person who is a suspected or probable SARS 
case-patient 
history of travel to an area with recent local transmission of 
SARS 
residing in an area with recent local transmission of SARS 
Probable case-patient: a suspected case-patient with: 
1. Radiographic evidence of infiltrates consistent with pneumonia or 
respiratory distress syndrome (RDS) on chest x-ray OR 
2. Consistent respiratory illness that is positive for SARS 
coronavirus by one or more assays, OR 
3. Autopsy findings consistent with the pathology of RDS without 
an identifiable cause 
aRevised May 1, 2003 (6). SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome.
 
bThe surveillance period begins on November 1, 2002, to capture cases of 
atypical pneumonia in China now recognized as SARS. International 
transmission of SARS was first reported in March 2003 for cases with onset in 
February 2003.  
cA close contact is someone who cared for, lived with, or had direct contact with 
respiratory secretions or body fluids of a suspected or probable SARS case-
patient. Fortunately, the outbreak demonstrated that SARS-
CoV transmission can be effectively contained by strict
adherence to infection-control practices. The use of N95
respirators or surgical masks was found to effectively
reduce transmission in hospitals (31,33); this protective
capacity of masks also has been shown for community
transmission (20). Premature relaxation of infection-con-
trol measures in some SARS-affected areas had profound
implications (35). Studies have demonstrated the impor-
tance of preexposure infection-control training and con-
sistent use of masks, gowns, gloves, and eye protection
(36).
Serologic and nucleic acid assays to detect SARS-CoV
infection and virus, respectively, were developed early in
the outbreak investigation (37–39). Comparative studies
have now confirmed the sensitivity and specificity of
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays for detecting SARS
antibodies (40) and of multitargeted real-time reverse tran-
scription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assays for
detecting SARS-CoV infection (41,42). Although these
assays are sensitive for detecting antibody and viral RNA,
they have provided limited help in diagnosing SARS early
in the course of disease (15,16,43,44). However, since the
SARS clinical case definition is nonspecific, capturing res-
piratory illness caused by other pathogens (e.g.,
Mycoplasma pneumoniae and influenza) (14), laboratory
confirmation of SARS-CoV infection is of particular
importance for focusing control efforts during an outbreak
and for refining SARS clinical studies. Such studies have
shown that less than one third of patients initially have res-
piratory symptoms and, although abnormal findings on
chest radiographs are universal for SARS patients, radi-
ographic changes may not be discerned until 7 to 10 days
after illness onset (45,46).
Diagnostic assays have also been important in describ-
ing the natural history of SARS infection and the associat-
ed immune response (29,43,47). Seroconversion within 28
days after symptom onset has been documented in 92% to
100% of probable SARS cases. Furthermore, during the
first 4 days of illness, SARS-CoV is detectable by RT-PCR
in respiratory secretions from less than half of the case-
patients. Virus is subsequently detected in stool, and peak
levels in both respiratory and stool specimens are found by
day 11–12 of illness; virus can persist in stool for weeks
thereafter (29,42,43,47). These studies underscore the con-
tinued need for SARS-CoV laboratory assays that are sen-
sitive early in the disease course to support rapid clinical
and infection-control decision-making. 
The possibility remains that SARS may reemerge from
unidentified animal reservoirs or from persistently infect-
ed humans. Current planning efforts for response to a
future SARS resurgence rely upon vigilant application of
clinical and epidemiologic criteria to evaluate cases of
febrile illness (48). Abold and swift public health response
to this disease must be applied with fairness and in a man-
ner that preserves dignity for all. Response to any future
resurgence of SARS will be aided by the body of knowl-
edge about the infection that now exists and by the inter-
national experience in successfully containing the first
SARS outbreak.
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